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Some firms offer their executives enormous perks. NorthWestern, a cash-strapped 
utility based in South Dakota, which had suspended its dividend, was scheduled to spend 
$450,000 in 2003 on the use of a corporate jet by its newly-appointed CEO, on top of a 
$565,000 salary, $600,000 signing bonus, and up to $423,000 in potential incentives. By 
contrast, the CEO of pharmaceutical giant, AstraZeneca, proudly states, “We use 
normally scheduled flights. You’ll see me at the airport like everyone else.” 
1 Why do 
some firms offer employees such lavish perks instead of giving employees more choice 
and perhaps greater utility by giving them the monetary equivalent in additional pay?  
By a perk, we refer to forms of non-monetary compensation offered to select 
employees. These range from the use of an executive jet or a chauffeur driven car to a 
giant corner office and country club memberships. Implied in the definition is that the 
perk is not strictly necessary for the accomplishment of the employee’s duties (scheduled 
commercial flights are available or the executive only works out of a small portion of the 
office), hence it is a form of compensation.    
In fact, the leading theory of perks in the corporate finance literature (following 
Grossman and Hart (1980) and Jensen (1976,1986)) is that they are a way for managers 
to misappropriate some of the surplus the firm generates. Managers can do so because 
perks are hard to observe by distant outsiders, and the value of perks is typically 
underreported to shareholders, if disclosed at all (there was public amazement at the size 
of the perks in former GE CEO Jack Welch’s retirement package and these came to light 
only through court documents filed by his wife during divorce proceedings).
2  Moreover, 
                                                 
1 From an article in USA Today, “Pricey Perks let Executives fly High”, August 5, 2003. 
2 SEC disclosure rules require that perquisites worth more than a certain value must be reported as other 
annual compensation in the proxy statement for the five-highest paid executives.  However, compliance 
and valuation of perquisites varies across firms.  For example, AIG discloses no costs of perks provided to   2
perks are one sign that the firm has a “free cash flow” problem with more cash than it 
knows how to spend (Jensen (1986)) so excessive perks are typically only the tip of an 
iceberg of wasteful corporate practices such as over-investment and lax management. 
Legions of theoretical papers have been written where managers extract value through 
perks.  
Despite the theoretical and popular focus on managerial excess as the explanation for 
why some firms offer so much more perks than others, there are other explanations.  For 
example, firms may offer perks to improve managerial productivity or to reinforce status 
and authority.  Our objective in this paper is to see whether the agency explanation just 
outlined offers an adequate description of the cross-sectional patterns in the data, or 
whether we have to turn to other explanations. To do this, we use a detailed database of 
job descriptions of top managers and their perk and compensation structures in over 300 
large U.S. firms tracked over a period of up to 14 years. Since there is so little work on 
perks, we document the nature of perks offered to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and 
divisional managers across firms as well as how they change over time.   
We then test the implications of the theories we have outlined. Since there is limited 
time variation in perks in our sample, we focus on the cross-sectional variation.  Broadly 
speaking, even though in some industries, or in individual firms, perks may be a form of 
excess, the evidence in favor of private benefits is, at best, mixed.  And, there is 
systematic evidence for other explanations -- such as perks as contributing to improved 
managerial productivity or enhancing managerial status and authority -- beyond simply 
                                                                                                                                                 
management stating they are a business expense that facilitates the performance of management 
responsibilities (USA Today, Aug 5, 2003).  As another example, Warren Buffet recognized shareholder 
sensitivity to excessive perks in his response to a reporter about Berkshire Hathaway’s acquisition of a 
corporate jet, named “The Indefensible,” he responded “I put it in our annual report in the tiniest type I 
could find.  So, I kind of tip-toed into the arena.” (Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report)   3
overpayment.  In particular, time saving perks are far more common in settings where the 
time saved is the greatest, and for employees whose time is most valuable.   
The narrow implication of these findings is that a blanket indictment of the use of 
perks is unwarranted. The broader implication is that there are very interesting aspects of 
organizational design that can be uncovered by examining non-monetary forms of 
compensation more carefully. This is therefore a call for further study. 
 
I.  Theories and their Implications 
We will start by outlining some theories of why firms might offer perks and the 
patterns they predict in the data. Because of its prominence, we start with the theory that 
perks are a form of private benefit. 
1.1. Perks and Private Benefits 
Consider the detailed implications of theories that suggest perks are private benefits.
3 
An immediate question is why perks and not pay? After all, would managers not prefer 
more fungible pay that they can use as desired? The answer has to be that perks are the 
preferred form of compensation because managers can get away with them more easily 
than with higher pecuniary pay – perhaps because the full value of perks is less likely to 
be disclosed to investors and investors are usually not in physical contact with 
management, so that they cannot see the extent of perk consumption for themselves.   
                                                 
3 Hart (2001) defines perks as non-pecuniary benefits like “fancy offices, private jets, the easy life, etc…. 
that are attractive to management but are of no interest to shareholders—in fact they reduce firm value. 
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that they are inefficient in the sense that one dollar of perks reduces 
firm value by more than a dollar.” Conceptually, perks as private benefits implies that the financial cost of 
the perk exceeds the associated productivity gains.  Perks as private benefits are distinct from pecuniary 
forms of compensation in that they are not transferable (or difficult to transfer).   4
Jensen (1986) points out that it is easier for managers to spend money on themselves 
in mature firms with few growth prospects (they have little by way of productive 
alternative investment) and substantial free cash flows (they do not have to go outside to 
raise resources from questioning investors). So perk consumption should be negatively 
related to the firm’s growth prospects, and positively related to the “free” cash the firm 
generates. According to Jensen, it is the combination of low investment opportunities and 
high cash flow that is particularly conducive to perk consumption. Of course, since perks 
are a form of compensation, it is important to correct for performance in checking if 
“free” cash matters.  
If perks are primarily a form of private benefit, better-governed firms will offer 
managers lower perks. Also, if perks are easier to pay because they are not disclosed, 
perks should be disproportionately more valuable to CEOs who disclose pay than to 
lower level managers who don’t.  Again, these effects should be most pronounced for 
firms that are prone to waste.   
Managerial agency problems are not the only explanations for perks. Let us now turn 
to other explanations. 
1.2. Perks and Productivity. 
  The firm may benefit more by offering perks than the individual manager does. 
For instance, a manager who arrives fresh after traveling in First Class on a transatlantic 
flight may be much better positioned to negotiate a multi-billion dollar contract than one 
who has been cramped in Economy class. The manager may not internalize the full value 
to the firm of being fresh, so he might prefer a cheaper form of travel if the firm did not 
pay for it.     5
It may also be more cost effective (in a broad sense) for the firm to provide some 
perks. The presence of an executive dining room obviates the need for executives to 
spend time away from work traveling to lunch. The dining room (or the coffee machine) 
may also increase serendipitous encounters between top executives, fostering greater 
communication. Finally, the firm may enjoy scale economies in providing a perk to its 
employees. For all these reasons, it may be cheaper for the firm to provide the perk than 
to have employees make individual uncoordinated choices. 
The conjecture that perks are awarded so that the firm can enhance the productivity 
of its employees leads to a number of empirical implications.
4 First, more productive 
employees should get more perks. Second, in situations where the time saved by a perk is 
particularly high, more perks should be provided. Finally, since timesaving is most 
valuable to the most productive employees, perks should increase disproportionately to 
such employees when the potential for timesaving increases. 
1.3. Perks and Status.   
Perks may also be a form of status or positional good (Hirsch (1976)) that reinforces 
an employee’s standing in the organization. In the colorful words of compensation expert 
Graef Crystal, 
5 
“We don’t wear crowns in this country or carry such symbols of office as a field 
marshal’s baton. So it is hard to tell the players apart, to spot the chairman of the board in 
a crowd. He’s the one wearing the Saville Row suit, but you have to be knowledgeable 
about clothes to pick him out. You’re more certain when you see him go by in a 
chauffeur driven limousine. Or when you are ushered into his office, which is of such 
size that you think the New York Knicks must use it for practice in off-hours.”  
 
                                                 
4 In the absence of more sophisticated models, we do not distinguish between productivity-enhancing and 
cost-minimizing perks.  The key distinction between productivity and private benefits explanations is that 
productive perks increase firm value, while perks that are private benefits do not.   
5 Crystal (1978) cited in Evans (1984).   6
More prosaically, employees may care both about their standing and the fact that it is 
well known within the organization. Unlike an employee’s pay, which is not widely 
known within the firm (except for the top managers whose pay is publicly disclosed), the 
fact that an employee has a chauffeur driven car or that he uses the corporate jet is widely 
seen and noticed by other employees within the firm. If relative standing within the firm 
is an important element of the utility derived from compensation (see Frank 
(1985a,1985b)), then perks can motivate far more cost-effectively than equivalent 
amounts of cash.
6 
  The army recognizes these sorts of motivation well by giving out medals for 
bravery that have a value far greater than the metal they are stamped on. 
7 But this raises 
a number of questions. First, why cannot corporations invent their own medals or 
ribbons, which will cost them nothing, instead of paying with perks? In truth, most perks 
do not cost much relative to managerial compensation, so they may in fact be ribbons. 
8 
Second, why does the CEO need perks – after all, everyone knows who he is and how 
much he earns. One explanation may be that the CEO needs to be offered perks (in fact, 
the most perks) so as to legitimize the status attached to the perk: a prestigious country 
club membership would not convey as much status for other executives if the CEO did 
not belong to it. Finally, if perks are rationed by the firm to convey status, it becomes 
clear why employees cannot be allowed to bid for them with their own money – the entire 
status value of medals for bravery would be lost if one could simply buy them at Macys. 
                                                 
6 In fact, even if everyone’s compensation is disclosed, perks may still play an additional role in conveying 
status. There are only so many corner offices or so many places on the corporate jet, and who gets them can 
signal the recipient’s place in the pecking order better than cash compensation (which is subject to noise of 
its own) can.  
7 Napoleon Bonaparte, the great French military commander, marveled at the motivational power of a small 
piece of ribbon (a decoration):  “If I had enough ribbon, I could conquer the world.”   
8Hewitt Associates has a rule of thumb for the estimated value of CEO perks at approx 1-3% of total 
compensation.      7
Moreover, the firm could head off a “perk” race and gross overinvestment by determining 
allocations itself. 
A number of implications follow if perks are meant to enhance status. If perks are 
meant to reinforce status, they are likely to be used in organizations that emphasize status 
by carefully delineating positions. Large firms are more likely to have well defined 
hierarchies. Also the steeper the hierarchy, the more likely are perks to be used at the top. 
Finally, the flattening of hierarchies is a recent event (see Rajan and Wulf (2003)). If 
perks have a strong inertial component, as we will document, older firms may offer more 
perks. 
1.4. Perks and Taxes. 
  And finally, we have taxes. The value of perks may be underreported by firms. 
This suggests a rationale for the firm to pay through perks rather than through pay – the 
after-tax cost to employees of an undervalued perk is lower than if the employees had to 
pay for them out of salary.  
1.5. Summary 
We have outlined a number of explanations for why some firms pay their employees 
with perks rather than their monetary equivalent. Our explanations are not mutually 
exclusive. In fact, they may be mutually reinforcing. For instance, the firm could let the 
CEO signal his status by paying him more and letting him indulge in “conspicuous 
consumption” (see Veblen (1899) and also Frank (1985a, 1985b) or Bagwell and 
Bernheim (1996) for insightful recent treatments). But it may be cheaper to pay him with 
a perk that performs the dual role of enhancing his productivity on the job and letting him 
signal. Our endeavor here is to see whether the private benefit explanation accounts in   8
reasonable measure for the patterns in the data, and if not, what other explanations are 
tenable. Our aim is not, however, to arrive at a mono-causal explanation.  
 
  II.   Data Description 
2.1. Sample Description 
The primary dataset used in this study includes a panel of more than 300 publicly 
traded U.S. firms over the years 1986-1999, spanning a number of industries. The data 
are collected from a confidential compensation survey conducted by Hewitt Associates, a 
leading human resources consulting firm specializing in executive compensation and 
benefits.  The survey is the largest private compensation survey (as measured by the 
number of participating firms) and is comprehensive in that it collects data on more than 
50 senior and middle management positions including both operational positions (e.g. 
Chief Operations Officer and Divisional CEO) and staff positions (e.g. Chief Financial 
Officer and Head of Human Resources).   
The survey typically covers all the positions at the top of the hierarchy and a sample 
of positions lower down. 
9 The data for each position include all components of 
compensation including salary, bonus, restricted stock, stock options, and other forms of 
long-term incentives (e.g. performance units) as well as a list of perks made available to 
that position.  To ensure consistency in matching these positions across firms, the survey 
provides benchmark position descriptions and collects additional data for each position 
including:  job title, number of employees under the position’s jurisdiction, the title of the 
                                                 
9 In this study, we use a subset of the survey’s benchmark positions:  Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
Divisional Manager (DM).   9
position that the job reports to (i.e. the position’s boss), and the number of reporting 
levels between the position and the board of directors.   
We believe the survey data are accurate for several reasons.  First, Hewitt consultants 
are knowledgeable about survey participants because they are assigned to client teams 
and typically work with specific clients for several years.  Moreover, while the 
participating firms initially match their positions to the benchmark positions in the 
survey, the consultant follows up to verify accuracy and spends an additional 8-10 hours 
on each questionnaire evaluating the consistency of responses with public data (e.g. 
proxy statements) and across years.  Potentially of more importance, participants have an 
incentive to provide accurate data because they use the survey results to set pay levels 
and design management compensation programs.  
The survey data are supplemented with information from several other datasets: 
Compustat for financial and segment information, CDA Spectrum for institutional 
shareholdings, Directory of Corporate Affiliations for year of founding, U.S. Census 
Bureau for data on county population and travel time to work, U.S. Department of 
Transportation for commercial flights by airport, and the U.S. Federation of Tax 
Administrators for marginal state tax rates. While the Hewitt survey is conducted in April 
of each year and the perk data describe the firm in the year of survey completion, some 
statistics (e.g. number of employees in the firm) represent the end of the most recent 
fiscal year.  To maintain consistency, we match the supplemental datasets using the year 
prior to the year of the survey.  Finally, not all variables are available for all positions, 
firms and years, and due to limitations in matching with the supplemental datasets, our 
samples are smaller for some parts of the analysis.   10
In Table 1, we present descriptive statistics for the firms in the sample.  While the 
dataset includes more than 300 firms, the exact number varies over the period, as firms 
enter and exit as survey participants.  The firms in the sample are large, well established 
and profitable with average size of approximately 44,000 employees, age of 93 years 
since founding, and operating return on assets of 16.7 %.  The typical firm in the sample 
is thus a large, mature, and stable firm. The sample firms span many industrial sectors of 
the economy, with some concentration in the food, paper, chemical, machinery, 
electrical, transportation equipment, instrumentation, communications and utilities 
industries.  
2.2.   Checks for Representativeness 
While Hewitt clients are more likely to participate in the survey, the sample includes 
many more firms than their consulting client base.  In general, firms that participate in the 
Hewitt survey also participate in other compensation consulting firm surveys (e.g. Hay 
Associates, Mercer, Towers Perrin, to name a few).  Consistent with Hewitt claims that 
many of the largest U.S. firms are survey participants, we find that more than 75% 
percent of the firms in the dataset are listed as Fortune 500 firms in at least one year and 
more than 85% are listed as Fortune 1000 firms.
 10  
Nevertheless, an important issue in datasets such as this one is the question of sample 
selection.  To test whether the firms in this dataset are distinctive from, or representative 
of, employers of similar size in their industry, we use Compustat data to match each firm 
in the Hewitt dataset to the firm closest in sales within its two-digit SIC industry in the 
                                                 
10The quality of a compensation survey to a participating firm is how representative it is of firms that the 
participant competes with in the executive labor market.  Hewitt’s promotional material states that survey 
participants include many of the Fortune 500 firms.  For example, in 1995, they stated that their participant 
list included 70 of the Fortune 100 firms.     11
year the firm joins the sample.  We then perform Wilcoxon signed rank tests to compare 
the Hewitt firms with the matched firms.   
While the firms in the Hewitt dataset are slightly larger in sales than the matched 
sample in the year that the firm joins the sample, we found no statistically significant 
difference in employment and profitability (return on sales).
11   We also found no 
statistically significant difference in sales growth, employment growth, or annual changes 
in profitability for all sample years.  In sum, while the Hewitt firms are larger than the 
matched sample, there is little additional evidence that these employers are not 
representative of the population of large industrial firms. This is not surprising given the 
large percentage of Fortune 500 firms that participate in the Hewitt survey.   
2.3. Facts about Perks 
As part of the annual compensation survey, Hewitt includes a section on perquisites 
in which they request detailed information on approximately 15 categories of perks.  The 
term “perquisite” can represent several types of employee benefits including:  time off 
without pay, executive services, nonperformance awards, healthcare, survivor protection, 
and retirement coverage. 
12  Perks covered by the Hewitt survey are primarily executive 
services (e.g. company plane, chauffer service, financial counseling), with only a few 
classified as nonperformance awards (e.g. loans) and healthcare (e.g. hospital 
examination).  A list and description of the perquisites covered in the 1995 survey are 
included in the Appendix.    
                                                 
11 The Hewitt firms are larger in sales than the matched sample of firms because in a significant number of 
the cases, the Hewitt firm is the largest firm in the industry thus forcing us to select a matched firm smaller 
in size.   
12 Categories outlined in Ellig (1981) for purposes of tax discussion.     12
Detailed information is collected for each perk including (i) eligibility criteria, e.g. 
number of domestic employees eligible and pay of the lowest position eligible, (ii) 
limitations, e.g. conditions for use of the company plane (i.e. when the plane can be 
scheduled without higher level approval) or limitations on personal use, and (iii) charge 
for use.  Finally, the survey includes a perquisites eligibility table that asks the respondent 
to indicate which perks, if any, are provided to each survey position including multiple 
incumbents.   
We start by reporting summary statistics on three perks:  company plane, chauffer 
service, and country club membership.  We focus on these perks because they are 
potentially the most valuable to the executive, most costly to the company, and they have 
been consistently defined in all years in the survey.
13  We will then sharpen the focus to 
company plane, which scores high on all these attributes and has the additional merit of 
being the canonical example of an excessive perk.  
For each perk, we create an indicator variable equal to one if the perk is offered to 
the employee and zero otherwise. An alternative and possibly more sensible measure is 
the Hewitt valuation of each perk.  However, valuation is not as precise as one might 
desire, even if firms and executives were willing to disclose full value, since firms are 
required by the SEC to disclose “incremental costs” of offering perquisites.
14  So, while 
Hewitt valuations provide some useful comparative benchmarks to survey participants, 
                                                 
13 Other perks covered by the survey change slightly over time.  For example, in earlier years, the types of 
company cars included luxury, full-size and intermediate.  In the last year of the survey, car types included 
super, luxury i, luxury ii, and full-size.   
14 But, what is the incremental cost to an airline company of offering a company plane?  In a similar vein, 
doesn’t Warren Buffet, who works out of Omaha, Nebraska, value the company plane more than CEOs 
who live and work in New York City?  In a passage in the 1992 Berkshire Hathaway annual report, Warren 
Buffet conveyed something about his implicit valuation of the corporate jet:  “Those readers with 
particularly sharp eyes will note that our corporate expense fell from $5.6 million in 1991 to $4.2 million in 
1992.  Perhaps you will think that I have sold our corporate jet, The Indefensible.  Forget it! I find the 
thought of retiring the plane even more revolting that the thought of retiring the Chairman.”   13
they might suffer from significant measurement error.
15  Because of these limitations, we 
use measures that simply indicate whether a perk is offered (or not offered) to a position 
in a given year. 
In this study, we focus on two positions:  Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the 
Division Manager (DM).  The CEO is the highest executive in the corporation and the 
Division Manager is the highest authority in the division, which is defined as the “lowest 
level of profit center responsibility for a business unit that engineers, manufactures, and 
sells its own products.” 
16  We primarily analyze CEO perks with the unit of observation 
in the CEO dataset being a perk offering to a CEO in a given year. The divisional 
manager perk variable is equal to the proportion of divisional managers within the firm 
receiving the perk. We also construct a perk differential measure that captures perk 
differences across the hierarchical levels within the firm.  Using company plane as an 
example, we construct a CEO-DM differential by subtracting the proportion of divisional 
managers with access to the plane from the CEO company plane indicator variable.  A 
value of one in this example means that the CEO can schedule the company plane while 
no divisional manager can.
17   
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the perks for CEO and Divisional Manager 
(DM) positions and the differential between the CEO and Divisional Manager.  The CEO 
can schedule the use of the company plane in 66% of the firm-years, gets chauffer service 
in 38%, and country club membership in 47% of the firm-years (column i). Thus the use 
                                                 
15 Hewitt’s median valuations for selected perks offered in 1994 to CEO positions in the survey are: 
$23,000 for the company plane, $17,600 for chauffer service, and $3,700 for country club memberships.   
16 For a thorough description of both of these positions, see Rajan and Wulf, 2003.   
17 Perk differentials defined in this way ignore the variation in the economic difference of the divisional 
manager positions across firms.  While we report the raw differentials in Table 2 through Table 4, we 
control for differences in the relative importance of divisional managers across firms by including average 
division size in the differential regressions.      14
of the company plane is the most common of the significant perks. In comparison to 
CEOs, divisional managers (column iii) are much less likely to be allowed to schedule 
the company plane (30% vs. 66%), receive chauffer services (6% vs. 38%), and get 
country club memberships (28% vs. 47%). The largest difference again is with the use of 
the company plane.
18    
An obvious question to ask is:  what is the relationship between pay and perks?  Are 
high-paying firms more likely to offer perks?  The answer is yes.  The logarithm of CEO 
salary plus bonus is positively correlated with company plane (correlation coefficient 
=0.30) and chauffer service (0.28), but not correlated with country club membership.  Of 
course these relationships might be explained by either firm size or industry effects--
larger firms and certain industries pay more and they also grant more perks.  To evaluate 
this, we regress the logarithm of salary and bonus on firm size, and industry and year 
indicators and estimate comparable regressions with each perk as the dependent variable 
(again controlling for size, industry and year). The correlations of the residuals from 
these regressions are smaller, but similar to the raw correlations listed above, with one 
exception:  pay and country club are now positively correlated (0.07).  So, on average, 
higher paying firms are more likely to offer perks to CEOs.
19 
Another interesting question is whether perk offerings have changed over time. One 
might imagine that perks have come under increased scrutiny with additional SEC 
                                                 
18 Frank (1985a) argues that relative standing matters more than the absolute level of consumption with 
certain types of goods.  In the example of the company plane, the CEO places more value on the right to 
schedule the plane when the division manager does not have that right. 
19 Also, individual perks offered to the CEO are positively correlated within firms:  planes and chauffer 
service (correlation coefficient =0.28), chauffer and country club memberships (0.12) and planes and 
country club memberships (0.10).  We find similar correlations between divisional manager perks.      15
disclosure requirements and pressure from the IRS to declare perks as taxable income.
20 
However, we find little variation in perks over the period in our sample.  Table 3 presents 
the yearly averages of perks that are offered to the CEO, the divisional manager 
positions, and the differential between the two.  The table includes firms and divisions 
that appear in the dataset for two consecutive years.  By focusing on this set of 
observations, we minimize biases from the exit and entry of firms.   
As we see from Table 3, there is a slight downward trend in perks over time for this 
sample of firms and divisions.  (The patterns for the whole sample are qualitatively 
similar.)  Focusing on CEO perks, company plane decreases slightly on average over the 
period from 0.74 in 1987 to 0.64 in 1999 (column i) with similar declines in chauffer 
service, and country club membership (columns ii-iii). Turning to divisional manager 
perks, we see similar slight declines (columns iv-vi).  These trends translate into 
relatively constant CEO-DM differentials (columns vii-ix).  Overall, the propensity to 
offer perks declines slightly over the period for the sample of survey participants.  
What might explain the slow downward trend in perk offerings especially given the 
large increases in pay and changes in both disclosure requirements and tax law over the 
period?  Limited time-series variation in perks could be due to the offsetting effects of 
different regulations.  Even if new disclosure rules had an adverse effect on the relative 
attractiveness of perks, subsequent tax legislation may have offset this, with the net effect 
                                                 
20 The SEC adopted more stringent disclosure requirements (effective in January, 1993) for all pay 
components of the top-five highest paid executives.  In this new ruling, perks worth more than $50,000 or 
10% of the executive’s total salary and bonus must be disclosed as other compensation in the proxy 
statement, and any perquisite worth more than 25% of the total of these extras must be detailed in a 
footnote. The stated purpose of the new rules were to “provide shareholders with a clear and concise 
presentation of compensation paid or awarded to executive officers, and the directors’ bases for making 
such compensation decisions.”  For a discussion of whether the SEC inadvertently created a bias in favor of 
or against certain forms of compensation, refer to Nebraska Law Review, 1993 (72 Nebraska Law Review 
804).     16
being little observable change.
21 Another explanation posited by compensation 
consultants is that employees consider perks a form of entitlement and as such, once they 
are granted, they are rarely taken away.  Since our sample is comprised of older firms 
(average age of 93 years), this might explain the relatively low incidence of perk 
adoption and suspension over the period. 
The limited change in perks over time suggests that cross-sectional analyses that 
explore the variation in perks across firms and across positions within firms might be 
more informative than the time-series changes.        
One place to begin analysis of cross-sectional variation is to ask whether the 
propensity to offer perks differs across industries.  Table 4 presents by 2-digit SIC 
industry, the average of the sum of the three perk indicators (Sum3) and each individual 
perk for the CEO and the sum of the three differentials (SumDiff3) and each individual 
CEO-DM differential.  We include only industries in which we have 50 or more firm-
year observations and rank the industries for both the sum of CEO perks and the sum of 
the differentials (rank of 1 is highest).  Firms operating in the petroleum refining industry 
(SIC 29) offer the most CEO perks overall (rank of 1 in column ii) and rank the highest in 
each category.  Moreover, the other oil & gas industry (SIC 13- Oil & Gas Extraction) 
                                                 
21For example, one year following the change in disclosure requirements, there was legislation passed 
which eliminated corporate tax deductibility for executive compensation in excess of $1 million unless it 
qualified as “performance-based” pay.  This was a provision in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993 (effective January, 1994) and implemented as section 162 (m) of the Internal Revenue Code. This 
change may have induced larger perk grants to high-paid CEOs as less visible forms of compensation 
moved increasingly “underground.” However, Rose and Wolfram (2002) document little effect of this 
change in legislation on compensation and conclude that corporate pay decisions were relatively insulated 
from this policy intervention.  While perk offerings may be similarly insulated to policy changes, 
McGahran (1988) finds that the combined effect of SEC perquisite disclosure requirements and IRS policy 
of taxing perquisites as income in 1987 caused a shift from perquisites to monetary compensation.   
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ranks the third highest in CEO perks.  By contrast, firms operating in the machines & 
computers industry (SIC 35) offer the fewest CEO perks (rank of 14). 
To evaluate the exclusivity of perks to CEOs by industry, we turn to the industry 
ranks of the sum of the three differentials.  Again, the petroleum refining industry ranks 
the highest in the average of the difference between CEO and divisional manager perks 
(rank of 1 in column vi). Firms in the machines & computers industry rank the lowest 
(rank of 14).  It is interesting that the industry Jensen singled out in his seminal 1986 
paper as a canonical example of corporate excess caused by free cash -- the Oil and Gas 
industry -- seems to have a very high level of perks and also a high differential.  
 
III.         Analysis 
3.1 Perks and Status 
We conjecture that larger, more hierarchical, older firms are more likely to offer 
perks if they are meant to enhance status. 
In Table 5, we begin with the dependent variable COPLANE: an indicator variable 
equal to one if the CEO has access to a company plane and zero otherwise. We 
sequentially include different measures of the firm’s hierarchy in the probit regressions: 
firm’s size (log of the number of employees), span of control or breadth of hierarchy (the 
number of positions reporting directly to the CEO) and depth or steepness of hierarchy 
(the average number of management levels between the CEO and division managers in a 
hierarchy).  These latter two measures are developed in Rajan and Wulf (2003).  We also   18
include year indicators to take care of any time trends, cluster errors by firm, and report 
estimates of marginal coefficients (evaluated at the mean).
22   
The coefficient estimate on size in column (i) is positive and significant (∃=0.16, 
t=6.04). A one standard deviation increase in SIZE is correlated with an increase of 
29.0% in the probability of a firm offering a company plane (at the mean).   The 
coefficient on span in column (ii) is negative and significant while the coefficient on 
depth in column (iii) is positive and significant.  Flatter firms are less likely to offer a 
company plane to the CEO.  A one standard deviation increase in SPAN is correlated 
with a decrease of 8.3 % in the probability of a company plane; while an increase in 
DEPTH is correlated with an increase of 9.2 % in the probability.  We get similar results 
when we replace depth by the average depth across firms in the same two-digit SIC 
industry (unreported).  Finally in column (iv), we include the number of years since the 
firm was founded (AGE) and it is positively correlated with the offering of a company 
plane.  A one standard deviation increase in AGE is correlated with a 17.1 % increase in 
the probability of a plane.   
Larger, flatter, older firms seem more likely to give access to a company plane.  As 
described earlier, perks are positively correlated with pay.  Clearly, some of these 
attributes of organizations are also correlated with pay (see Rajan and Wulf (2003), for 
example). Do the relationships between company plane and the size, hierarchy, and age 
of the firm persist even after we include CEO pay as an explanatory variable?  
 Since perks and pay are endogenous variables, we could have biased coefficients if 
we include pay directly.  So, for example, a lax board of directors may authorize both 
                                                 
22 We report robust standard errors by clustering by firm to address both heteroskedasticity and non-
independence of errors within firms across time.  Also, as a robustness check, we discuss a between 
estimate by running regressions based on firm averages of observations across years in Section 3.5.   19
high pay and excessive perks.  Omission of a proxy for the strength of the board, would 
bias our estimated coefficients.  One possibly exogenous determinant of pay is the 
incumbent’s tenure in the CEO position. We use it as an instrument for the logarithm of 
salary and bonus and estimate a 2SLS regression where pay is the dependent variable in 
the first stage. We also include industry indicators to ensure that our proxy for 
organizational structure is not a proxy for industry.  In Table 5 column (v) (the second 
stage), we see that the magnitude of the coefficient on size is larger and that on span is 
comparable to those of the earlier specifications that do not control for pay or industry.
23 
Both coefficient estimates on size and span are significant. We also include industry 
indicators in Table 5 regressions that do not control for pay and coefficients generally 
remain significant (among the proxies for organizational structure, only depth loses 
significance).  We don’t report the results of a regression with all hierarchical variables 
because span and depth are highly correlated and we have a limited number of 
observations with firm age.   
In sum then, larger, older, more hierarchical organizations tend to offer more perks. 
Size may just be because of scale economies in offering and keeping track of perks (how 
many small firms would have a company plane). The effect of age may simply be 
because inertia renders older firms more immune to the downward trend in whether a 
plane is offered. What is particularly interesting is that hierarchical organizations 
(narrower span, more depth) offer more perks, even correcting for size. These are also 
ones that delegate less responsibility and where the CEO is more remote from employees 
(see Rajan and Wulf (2003)). Perks may then serve to consolidate the CEO’s status in the 
                                                 
23 The 2SLS specification uses OLS estimation in both first and second stages, thus the estimates can’t be 
directly compared to the earlier probit specifications.  However, our primary objective in reporting these 
estimates is to demonstrate that the results are qualitatively similar when we control for pay.     20
eyes of employees, and allow his orders to be obeyed more easily. The importance of 
perks in enhancing CEO status is certainly an issue worth further exploration. 
3.2. Perks and Taxes 
Different states have different income tax rates.  Executives living in high tax states 
may value perks more than cash compensation relative to those living in low tax states.  
To evaluate whether perks are a tax-advantaged form of pay, we test whether firms 
headquartered in high tax states offer more perks.  Since CEOs are most likely in the 
highest tax bracket, we define STATETAX as the highest marginal state income tax rate 
for 2003 (published by the Federation of Tax Administrators).
24  In a regression of 
COPLANE on firm size, the tax rate for the headquarters state, SPAN, and industry and 
year indicators, the coefficient estimate on STATETAX is negative and insignificant (not 
reported).  There is little support for the tax explanation in the cross-sectional analysis 
across firms. 
3.3. Testing for Private Benefits 
Let us turn now to evaluating Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis that states that 
consumption of private benefits should be larger in firms with lots of free cash that 
operate in industries with limited investment opportunities.   
We begin by analyzing the relationship between a firm’s free cash flow and the use 
of a company plane.  Of course, to include a measure of free cash flow, we have to 
deduce how much cash is truly free and accounting can obscure this. We measure free 
                                                 
24 CEOs may not live in the state in which they work.  For example, many executives who work in New 
York City live in either New Jersey or Connecticut.  However, this is more of an exception than the rule in 
most states.  The results are robust to excluding firms that are located in New York County, NY.       21
cash flow (CASHFLOW) as lagged operating income before depreciation minus the sum 
of interest, taxes paid, and capital expenditures all divided by beginning of year assets.
25 
  We would expect compensation to increase in performance. If we do not correct for 
performance, an observed positive correlation between free cash and perks could simply 
reflect the fact that better performance is rewarded than the fact that free cash flow is 
being misused. We include a crude measure of Economic Value Added computed as 
lagged operating income before depreciation minus the sum of depreciation, taxes paid, 
cost of capital (10% of beginning-of-year assets) all divided by beginning-of-year 
assets.
26 In Table 6 column (i), when we include both of these measures in addition to 
firm size, span, industry and year indicators, the coefficient estimate on free cash flow is 
positive and that on EVA is negative, but both are insignificant.
27  
A more subtle implication of Jensen’s hypothesis is that perk consumption should be 
the greatest in firms that are generating free cash and are operating in industries with 
weak investment prospects.  Executives in these “Jensen-type” firms are the most likely 
to be extracting firm surplus through private benefits. To test this, we compute industry 
investment opportunities (GROWTH) in a given year as follows: we average the 
percentage change in a firm’s rate of investment (capital expenditures divided by lagged 
assets) in the future three periods for all firms in Compustat.  We then average this 
                                                 
25 Free cash could be thought of as the cash left after necessary and pre-committed expenses and 
investments. What we see is the operational cash flow after expenses, some of which may be necessary, 
some not. By subtracting all expenses, we may underestimate free cash flow. But not all investment is 
discretionary. By not subtracting investments, we may be biasing free cash upwards.  Our measure of cash 
flow is defined as lagged operating income before depreciation (data 13)-interest (data 15)-taxes paid [taxes 
(data 16)-change in deferred taxes (data 74)]-capital expenditures (data 128) all divided by beginning of 
year assets (data 6).   
26 Our measure of EVA is defined as lagged operating income before depreciation (data 13)-depreciation 
(data 14)-taxes paid [taxes (data 16)-change in deferred taxes (data 74)]-10%*beginning of year assets 
(data 6) all divided by beginning of year assets. 
27 The difference between the two measures is primarily depreciation net of investment. The lack of a 
significant coefficient may simply be because variation in this difference is not enough to estimate the two 
coefficients precisely.   22
prospective growth rate across 3-digit SIC industries to obtain GROWTH for each 
industry.  
In Table 6 column (ii), we include this industry measure directly, CASHFLOW, and 
an interaction term between this measure and firm cash flow while controlling for firm 
size, EVA, SPAN, and year indicators.
28  The coefficient estimate on GROWTH is 
positive and significant (t=4.46).  Firms in industries that are investing at a growing rate 
also seem to invest more in providing company planes to their CEOs. It may be that these 
firms have more access to funds or it may be that CEO time is more valuable in these 
firms. We will return to questions of productivity shortly. Interestingly, the coefficient 
estimate on the interaction term is negative and significant (t=-2.89). 
The interaction could mean either slow growth firms with high cash flow have more 
perks or high growth firms with low cash flow have more perks. The former would be 
consistent with Jensen, the latter not. To test this, we construct an indicator (JENSEN) for 
“Jensen-type” firms -- those in the lowest quartile of growth and the highest quartile of 
cash flow in a year.  We also construct an indicator (HiGrLoCF) for firms in the highest 
quartile of growth and the lowest quartile of cash flow.
29  
In Table 6 column (iii), we include the two indicators while controlling for firm size, 
EVA, SPAN and industry and year indicators.  The coefficient estimate for JENSEN is 
insignificant.  Interestingly, the coefficient estimate for HiGrLoCF is positive and 
                                                 
28 We exclude industry indicators from this specification because our measure of growth is an industry 
measure.  If we included industry indicators, we would only pick up the time series variation in GROWTH 
plus the differences between 3-digit SIC categories (used to define GROWTH) and 2-digit SIC indicators. 
29 For completeness, we also include indicator variables for firms in the highest quartiles of growth and 
cash flow and the lowest quartiles of growth and cash flow.  The coefficients on these indicators are 
insignificant (unreported) and the regression results are not qualitatively different when the indicators are 
excluded.     23
significant (t=2.69).  Firms operating in high growth industries that are generating low 
levels of free cash flow are 11.3% more likely to offer access to the company plane.  
A more subtle prediction of private benefits--since perks are easier to hide from 
shareholders and CEOs disclose pay while divisional managers don’t-- is that CEOs 
should get greater access to the company plane relative to divisional managers.  So, one 
implication of the free cash flow hypothesis is that Jensen firms should have a higher 
differential. We estimate a specification similar to that in column (iii) but with the CEO-
DM differential in company plane as the dependent variable (and only using those firm-
years in which the CEO has plane access).  We also include the average of the logarithm 
of division employees to control for differences in the importance of divisional managers 
across firms.  In Table 6 column (iv), we find a positive and significant coefficient 
estimate on the HiGrLoCF indicator (t=2.66) and a negative, but not significant 
coefficient on the JENSEN indicator.   
So growing firms offer more perks, especially firms that are growing but not 
financing through internal cash flow. The latter also offer their CEOs relatively more 
perks, unlike Jensen-type firms. Our findings are somewhat in contradiction to the spirit 
of the free cash flow hypothesis, but may well be a form of agency (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)) where managers of growing firms financed from outside are less careful with 
other people’s money. 
If perks are some sort of agency problem, we should see that better external 
governance leads to lower perks and this relationship should be most pronounced in firms 
that exceed perk norms. One measure of exogenous changes in governance is changes in 
state takeover laws (see, for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000)).  They focus on   24
Business Combination (BC) laws that “are likely to have strong effects on [reducing the 
power of] disciplinary takeovers because they place in directors’ hands, before the 
acquiring person becomes an interested shareholder, the right to refuse such 
transactions.” 
30 In essence, these laws tip the balance of power toward management and 
weaken corporate governance.  We should see higher perks in firms that are incorporated 
in states with BC laws.   
For our sample of firms, we use the state of incorporation as listed by Compustat.  
We create an indicator variable equal to one for the year in which the state adopts a BC 
law and the years following.
31  We regress COPLANE on the BC indicator while 
controlling for log of firm employees, cash flow, growth, EVA, span, and industry and 
year indicators.  We find a positive and significant coefficient on the BC indicator 
(coefficient of 0.161 and t-stat=2.40; unreported).  This suggests that CEO access to 
company planes is 16.1% more likely in firms that are incorporated in states with BC 
laws (and associated weaker governance).  However, this relationship is not robust to the 
exclusion of those firms incorporated in Delaware.
32  
We now turn to firm measures of governance that vary somewhat over the period, 
but are potentially endogenous. We compute two measures. According to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986), large shareholders should prevent managers from consuming excessive 
private benefits. So, one measure of good governance is FRACINST: the fraction of the 
                                                 
30 “BC laws impose a moratorium (3 to 5 years) on specified transactions between the target and a raider 
holding a specified threshold percentage of stock unless the board votes otherwise before the acquiring 
person becomes an interested shareholder.” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2000).     
31 For the adoption of BC laws, we use Table 1 of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000).  This information 
includes state adoptions up through 1995 and our sample includes years through 1999.  However, most of 
the BC law adoptions occurred in years prior to 1995, particularly in states in which the majority of firms 
are incorporated, e.g. Delaware.   
32The BC indicator equals one for approximately 78% of the firm-year observations by 1988, the year in 
which Delaware adopts a BC law.     25
firm’s stock held by institutions with greater than 5 % ownership in the prior year. 
Another measure is LARGEINST: an indicator if the firm has an institutional investor 
owning 10 percent or more of the firm’s stock in the prior year. Again, we include 
interactions between these governance variables and the two firm type indicators (as well 
as the indicators directly). 
In Table 6 column (v) we find a negative, but insignificant coefficient estimate on 
FRACINST and positive, but insignificant coefficient estimates on Jensen and 
HiGRLoCF.  Interestingly, we find a negative and significant coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between Jensen and FRACINST (t=-2.32), but no significance on that 
between HiGRLoCF and FRACINST.  These results are robust in the 2SLS regression 
that controls for CEO pay (column vi) and qualitatively similar results hold in an 
analogous regression using the other measure of governance (LARGEINST; not 
reported).  So, on average, we find no direct relationship between governance and access 
to corporate jets and no direct effect of being a Jensen firm. Yet, in these Jensen firms, 
we find that better governance is associated with a lower incidence of plane ownership. 
However, we find no association between governance and high growth, low cash flow 
firms (HiGRLoCF).   
The bottom line is that we do not see a pattern that is fully consistent with a free cash 
flow explanation or a broader agency explanation. Some firms offer more perks but these 
are not the firms predicted by the free cash flow hypothesis. On the other hand, 
governance does seem to be associated with lower perks in “free cash flow” firms but not 
in the firms earlier identified as having more perks than the norm.
33 
                                                 
33 Another implication of the private benefits theory is that if perks are easier to pay because they are not 
disclosed, the SEC’s change to more stringent disclosure requirements for compensation in 1993 could   26
3.4.  Testing for Productivity 
In stark contrast to private benefits is the theory that perks are offered to enhance the 
productivity of recipients.  Managers that operate larger firms should receive additional 
perks in order to enhance productivity.  The evidence presented earlier suggests that 
larger firms are more likely to offer the CEO access to a company plane. In addition to 
firm size, the location of a firm’s headquarters has implications for which perks might 
improve CEO productivity.   In particular, the use of company planes may be more 
efficient for firms located far from airports relative to those in close proximity to airline 
hubs.   
We begin by including characteristics of the county in which the firm is 
headquartered.  Large airports, airline hubs, and thus convenient commercial flights are 
more easily accessible in large urban areas.  In Table 7 column (i), we regress COPLANE 
on the logarithm of firm employees, the log of population for the county in which the 
firm is headquartered, span, and industry and year indicators.
34  The coefficient estimate 
for log of county population is indeed negative and statistically significant (t=-4.00).  A 
one standard deviation increase in population is correlated with a decrease of 18.3% in 
the probability of a firm offering a company plane.  Firms headquartered in more 
populated counties are less likely to operate a company plane.   
                                                                                                                                                 
change the attractiveness of perks as a form of pay.  In a regression that includes an indicator variable that 
equals one in the years after 1992 (SECDUM), in addition to firm size, SPAN, a trend variable, and 
industry indicators, the coefficient on SECDUM is positive and significant.  So, while company planes are 
becoming less common (negative coefficient on trend), the downward trend has slowed after 1992.  
Certainly, the trends seem to be slower moving than a change in SEC disclosure (or a change in allowable 
corporate tax deductions of compensation) would imply.  In fact, returning to Table 3 and the trends in 
perks, we see no discrete jumps in CEO company plane in any of the years.   
34 Population by county is the number of people in thousands for the county in which the firm is 
headquartered.   Population figures are those reported by the U.S. Census Bureau in the years 1990 and 
2000 (interleaving years are extrapolated using the annual growth rate between these years).     27
Certainly, we would expect county population to be highly correlated with proximity 
to those airports with a variety of scheduled flights in terms of frequency and destination.  
To test this further, we construct a more refined measure of commercial flight 
accessibility by using data for the largest 200 airports in the U.S.  We define FLIGHTS as 
the logarithm of the annual number of departing flights in a given year from airports 
within a 50-mile radius of the center of the county in which the firm is headquartered.
35  
In Table 7 column (ii), we include this measure in place of county population in the 
earlier regression.  The coefficient estimate on the number of flights is negative and 
statistically significant (t=-3.14) and the magnitude of the association is economically 
significant.  A one standard deviation increase in the number of flights is correlated with 
a decrease of 15.5% in the probability of a firm offering a company plane. CEOs that 
work in headquarters located in close proximity to larger airports are less likely to have 
access to a company plane.  This evidence supports the productivity explanation of why 
firms provide CEOs access to corporate jets.   
A more subtle implication of the productivity hypothesis is that more timesaving 
perks should be offered to managers who are most productive. A number of economists 
argue (see, for example, Calvo and Wellisz (1979), Rosen (1982)) that heads of larger 
units are likely to be more productive both because more talented managers are hired to 
head larger units and because their decisions impact more people at the margin. One 
measure of the productivity of a manager is therefore the size of the unit they head. 
                                                 
35 The data source for the number of flights and airport location is the U.S. Department of Transportation T-
100 database. The data source for the longitude and latitude of county centers is from the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  We calculated the spherical distance between airport locations and county centers both specified 
by longitude and latitude coordinates.     28
 So we should see that being more distant from a large airport should make it more 
likely that CEOs of larger firms should have access to a company plane. Therefore we 
include interactions between firm size and population and firm size and flights. We find 
the coefficients on the interactions to be negative and significant as expected when using 
population as a proxy for commercial airline accessibility (Table 7 column (iii)). The 
coefficient is negative, but not quite significant (t=-1.59) when we use flights in place of 
population.
36 
Another implication then is that the perk differential between the CEO and the 
divisional manager should increase in the size of the firm and decrease in the size of the 
unit headed by the divisional manager. In Table 7 column (iv), we regress the company 
plane differential on firm size, population, division size, and industry and year indicators.  
We do not find a significant coefficient for population, suggesting perhaps that 
productivity differences within firms are not sufficiently different to warrant substantially 
different access to the company plane. However, we do find that the differential goes up 
in the size of the firm and falls in the average size of the division, consistent with the 
productivity explanation. 
Finally, we do have another perk that is directly related to travel:  chauffer service.  
Firms that are headquartered in more populated areas should be more likely to offer 
chauffer service to CEOs in order to increase productivity during their commute.  We 
define CHAUFFER as an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO has access to 
chauffer service and zero otherwise.  We regress CHAUFFER on the log of firm 
                                                 
36 County population and the annual number of flights from proximate airports are positively correlated 
(correlation coefficient=0.60).  Two facts that reduce the correlation:  (i) some hubs are located in less 
populated cities (e.g. TWA’s hub in St. Louis) and (ii) in large metro areas, county population understates 
the number of people living in the metropolitan area that are served by large airports.     29
employees, the log of population for the county in which the firm is headquartered, and 
industry and year indicators (unreported).  The coefficient estimate on firm size is 
positive and significant.  Larger firms are more likely to offer chauffer service.  
Moreover, the coefficient estimate on population is positive and highly significant 
(t=3.47).  Larger firms and firms headquartered in more populated counties are more 
likely to offer chauffer service to their CEOs.  
Again, county population of headquarters is surely positively correlated with the 
length of the CEO’s commute.  However, we construct a more refined measure by 
defining TRAVEL as the median travel time to work in number of minutes for workers 
residing in the county in which the firm is headquartered.  When we include this measure 
in place of county population in the earlier regression (unreported), the coefficient 
estimate is again positive and highly statistically significant (t=5.00).
37  CEOs that work 
in headquarters located in either larger counties or counties with longer median commute 
times are more likely to have access to a chauffer service.  This evidence strongly 
supports the productivity explanation of why firms provide CEOs with chauffer service.
38 
In sum, there is evidence in support of the productivity explanation.  Company 
planes are less common in firms that are headquartered in counties with larger 
populations and less common in firms that are in close proximity to larger airports.  
                                                 
37 The data source for the median travel time to work is the U.S. Census Bureau. We use data reported from 
the 1990 and 2000 surveys, and based on the average annual growth rate over the decade, we extrapolate 
data for the intervening years and the years prior to 1990. The ideal measure for our purposes is the travel 
time for individuals who work in a county instead of those who reside in a county.  This measure probably 
understates the commuting time for many CEOs because in some counties, the proportion of those living in 
a county that also work in a county is low.  For example, New York City headquartered firms draw many 
people from surrounding suburbs and not many NYC residents work outside of the city, so median travel 
time for NYC residents will understate travel time for NYC workers.   
38The coefficients on the interactions between firm size and population and firm size and travel are not 
significant in the CHAUFFER regressions, nor are the coefficients on the institutional shareholder 
measures.   
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Moreover, the economic significance of each of these correlations is significant and 
robust to alternative specifications. Especially interesting is that larger firms tend to offer 
more use of the company plane when the time saving entailed for their CEO is more 
substantial.      
3.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Let us now turn to simultaneously evaluating the evidence supporting the private 
benefits and productivity explanations.  In Table 7 columns (v) and (vi), we include both 
private benefit measures and productivity measures to evaluate the robustness of the 
statistical significance and the relative magnitude of the association between these 
measures and company plane access.  We estimate the same basic regression as that in 
Table 6 column (v), but also include population as a proxy for airline accessibility and 
CEO pay as independent variables. In Table 7 columns (v) and (vi), the sign and 
significance of the coefficient estimates are qualitatively similar to the earlier analyses.   
Most notably, firms headquartered in more populated counties and flatter firms are 
less likely to offer plane access and stronger governance in Jensen-type firms reduces the 
incidence of plane access. When we use the number of flights as a proxy for airline 
access and LARGEINST as a measure of governance, we get qualitatively similar results. 
Interestingly, the magnitudes of the correlations for the productivity measures are larger 
than those for private benefits.  In column (v), a one standard deviation increase in 
population is associated with a 20.5 % decline in the probability of offering plane access, 
while a one standard deviation increase in the interaction between Jensen and 
FRACTINST is associated with a 5.1 % decline.     31
  Finally, we have used a panel where we have clustered firm-specific observations. 
Since much of the information is in the cross-section, one way to correct (perhaps 
overcorrect) for correlation among errors is to compute a between estimate by running 
the regression based on firm averages of observations across years. We find that only the 
coefficient on population or flights continues to be statistically significant. 
Overall, we have found mixed support for the private benefits explanation. We do not 
see a pattern that is fully consistent with a free cash flow explanation or a broader agency 
explanation. The firms that offer more perks are not those predicted by the free cash flow 
hypothesis and while governance does seem to be associated with lower perks in Jensen-
type firms, it is has no such association in “perk-intensive” firms.  By contrast, there is 
more compelling and robust evidence in support of alternative explanations—especially 
perks as a means to enhance productivity.  More productive employees at the top of a 
firm’s hierarchy are more likely to get perks.  Time-saving perks are more common in 
settings where the time saved by the perk is higher and more frequently offered to the 
most productive employees as the potential for timesaving increases.  Lastly, steeper 
firms are more likely to offer perks to CEOs.  This is consistent with perks as a means to 
enhance CEO status, certainly an issue worth further exploration.   
The narrow implication of these findings is that a blanket indictment of the use of 
perks is unwarranted. The broader implication is that there are very interesting aspects of 
organizational design that can be uncovered by examining non-monetary forms of 
compensation more carefully. This is therefore a call for further study.   32
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Notes: ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by beginning of year assets. SPAN is the number of positions reporting to the CEO and DEPTH is the average 
number of positions between the CEO and the divisional manager in a firm’s organizational hierarchy (see Rajan and Wulf, 2003). AGE is the number of years since firm founding as 
reported by the Directory of Corporate Affiliations. CASHFLOW is defined as operating income before depreciation minus the sum of interest, taxes paid, and capital expenditures all 
divided by beginning of year assets. EVA is defined as operating income before depreciation minus the sum of depreciation, taxes paid, cost of capital (10% of beginning of year assets) 
all divided by beginning of year assets.  GROWTH is defined as the average 3-digit SIC industry growth in the rate of investment (capital expenditures divided by lagged assets) in the 
future 3 periods. JENSEN and HiGRLoCF are indicator variables for firms in the lowest quartile of industry growth/highest quartile of cash flow, and highest quartile of industry growth 
/lowest quartile of cash flow, respectively, in a given year. BCDUM is an indicator variable equal to one for the year in which the state of incorporation for the firm adopts a BC law and 
the years following. FRACTINST is the fraction of shares owned by institutional shareholders with more than 5 % ownership.  LARGEINST is a dummy variable equal to one if there is 
an institutional shareholder with greater than or equal to 10% ownership. POPULATION is the logarithm of the number of people in thousands in the county in which the firm is 
headquartered. FLIGHTS is defined as the logarithm of the annual number of departing flights in a given year from airports within a 50-mile radius of the center of the county in which 
the firm is headquartered. TRAVEL as the median travel time to work in number of minutes for workers residing in the county in which the firm is headquartered. STATETAX is the 
highest marginal state tax rate in 2003 as published by the Federation of Tax Administrators.














         
Size (000’s Firm Employees)  43.82  69.38  0.94  825.00  2355 
Sales ($M)  7752.46  12656.70  121.65  153627.00  2369 
Return on Assets (ROA)  0.167  0.078  -0.071  0.965  2359 
Number of Positions Reporting to CEO (SPAN)  5.5  2.6  1.0  14.0  2425 
Number of Reporting Levels (DEPTH)  1.3  0.8  0.0  4.0  2415 
Firm Age (Years since founding)  93.0  38.0  1.0  197.0  1107 
Cash Flow  0.040  0.070  -0.319  0.539  2108 
Economic Value Added (EVA)  -0.008  0.062  -0.268  0.473  2158 
Growth (Industry Growth in Rate of Investment)  -0.053  0.119  -0.650  0.575  2418 
Jensen (Low Growth/ High Cashflow)  0.077  0.267  0.000  1.000  2124 
High Growth/ Low Cashflow  (HiGRLoCF)  0.070  0.255  0.000  1.000  2124 
Business Combination Law (BCDUM)  0.84  0.37  0.00  1.00  2311 
Fraction owned by Institutions (FRACTINST)  0.083  0.102  0.000  0.648  1908 
Presence of Large Institutional Shareholder (LARGEINST)  0.179  0.384  0.000  1.000  1908 
Population by county of headquarters  (000’s) (POPULATION)  1645.8  1999.4  21.5  9329.9  2405 
Annual flights within 50 mile radius of headqtrs  (000’s) (FLIGHTS)  328.8  275.8  0  961.7  2393 
Median travel time to work in county of headqtrs  (TRAVEL)  24.6  3.9  16.0  33.9  2369 
State Income Tax Rate-highest marginal rate (STATETAX)  4.2  3.6  0.0  9.3  2405 






Notes:  Each CEO perk variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the position is offered the perk in a given year and zero otherwise. Each 
divisional manager perk variable is the proportion of divisional managers within the firm that are offered the perk in a given year.  CEO-Divisional 
Manager Differential is the difference between the CEO perks and the proportion of divisional manager perks within the firm in a given year.  The 
differential takes the value of 1 when the CEO receives the perk and no divisional manager does and zero when both the CEO and all of the 







Table 2:  Perquisites for CEO, Divisional Manager, CEO-DM Differential 
Company Plane, Chauffer Service, and Country Club Membership 




Divisional Manager (DM) 
CEO-Divisional Manager 
Differential   




Mean  STD Mean STD 
Firm-Years 
N 
  (i) (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)   
           
Company  Plane  0.66  0.47 0.30 0.44 0.36 0.46  2359 
Chauffer  Service  0.38  0.49 0.06 0.24 0.32 0.46  2359 
Country Club Membership  0.47  0.50  0.28  0.43  0.20  0.39  2359 
             36
Table 3:  Trends in Perquisites-Sample with Two Consecutive Years (1987-1999) 
Sample Averages for CEO, Divisional Manager, and CEO-Divisional Manager Differential 
 










Plane Chauffer Country 
Club 




 (i)  (ii) (iii)    (iv)  (v) (vi)  (vii)  (viii)  (ix)   
                 
1987  0.74 0.40  0.53  134  0.34 0.08  0.32 0.41 0.32  0.21  133 
1988  0.74 0.43  0.50  147  0.35 0.07  0.30 0.40 0.36  0.20  143 
1989  0.72 0.47  0.51  152  0.33 0.09  0.30 0.40 0.36  0.21  149 
1990  0.68 0.46  0.51  162  0.30 0.11  0.31 0.38 0.34  0.20  159 
1991  0.66 0.44  0.47  172  0.32 0.10  0.28 0.35 0.33  0.19  170 
1992  0.66 0.43  0.48  169  0.31 0.08  0.30 0.36 0.35  0.18  167 
1993  0.68 0.40  0.49  174  0.31 0.06  0.29 0.37 0.34  0.20  173 
1994  0.66 0.39  0.52  163  0.31 0.05  0.31 0.34 0.35  0.21  162 
1995  0.64 0.35  0.49  157  0.31 0.07  0.29 0.32 0.29  0.20  154 
1996  0.68 0.38  0.48  146  0.26 0.05  0.27 0.42 0.34  0.21  143 
1997  0.71 0.32  0.43  138  0.32 0.04  0.27 0.39 0.28  0.18  132 
1998  0.68 0.32  0.41  111  0.30 0.03  0.21 0.37 0.31  0.21  107 
1999  0.64 0.31  0.38  95 0.23 0.01  0.22 0.39 0.31  0.18  88 
                 
 










Table 4:  Distribution of Sample by 2-digit SIC Code 
CEO Perks and CEO-Divisional Manager Perk Differential 
Sample Average and Rank Among Industries 





CEO-Divisional Manager Differential 
   
SIC Industry Sum3  Rank Plane  Chauffer
Country 





   (i)  (ii)  (iii) (iv)  (v)  (vi) (vii)  (viii)  (ix)  (x)   
                       
29  Petroleum  Refining  2.73 1 1.00 0.80  0.93  1.59  1 0.72 0.45  0.42  59 
48  Communications  1.99 2 0.91 0.59  0.50  0.79  10  0.33 0.31  0.15 119 
13  Oil & Gas Extraction  1.97  3  0.85  0.31  0.81  1.04  7  0.45  0.31  0.28  68 
37 Transportation  Equip.  1.83  4  0.90 0.38  0.54  1.23  3 0.65 0.37  0.21 201 
28  Chemical  1.81 5 0.72 0.68  0.41  1.24  2 0.38 0.61  0.25  407 
20  Food  1.76 6 0.86 0.51  0.39  0.94  8 0.41 0.43  0.11  165 
26  Paper    1.60 7 0.92 0.32  0.36  1.13  4 0.60 0.28  0.25  132 
36  Electronic  Equipment  1.55 8 0.76 0.29  0.50  1.08  6 0.54 0.31  0.23  128 
38  Instrumentation  1.43 9 0.61 0.38  0.44  0.91  9 0.41 0.30  0.20  127 
73  Business  Services  1.42  10  0.42 0.40  0.60  1.09  5 0.31 0.42  0.36  53 
33 Primary  Metals  1.35  11  0.68  0.04 0.63  0.50 12  0.39  0.00 0.11 71 
49  Utilities  1.26 12 0.52  0.23  0.51  0.52  11 0.19  0.19  0.14  134 
30  Rubber & Misc. Plastics  1.22  13  0.59  0.19  0.44  0.49  13  0.23  0.19  0.07  63 
35  Machines  &  Computers 0.78 14 0.36  0.12  0.30  0.42  14 0.16  0.13  0.14  249 
    
 
Notes:  Industries represented include only those with 50 or more firm-year observations.  Sum3 is the sum of CEO indicators for company plane, chauffer 
service, and country club membership.  SumDiff3 is the sum of the CEO-Divisional Manager differential of company plane, chauffer service, and country 





























Notes:  SIZE is defined as the logarithm of the number of firm employees. SPAN is the number of positions reporting to the CEO and DEPTH is the average 
number of positions between the CEO and the divisional manager in a firm’s organizational hierarchy (see Rajan and Wulf, 2003). AGE is the number of years 
since firm founding as reported by the Directory of Corporate Affiliations.  In the 2SLS regression (column v), the first-stage regression is the logarithm of CEO 
salary plus bonus regressed on incumbent’s tenure in the CEO position in number of months while controlling for firm size, span, and industry and year 
indicators. The coefficient estimate on tenure in this first-stage regression is positive and highly significant (t=6.66) and the R-sqd equals 0.55. We lose 
observations in the 2SLS specification because we do not have tenure data for 1998 or 1999.  SIC indicators are 2-digit SIC codes. All specifications report 
robust standard errors by clustering by firm and all variables have been winsorized at the 99
th percentile.  ***/**/* represent significance at the 1%/5%/10% 
level. 
Table 5:  Perks and Status-- Probit and Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent Variable is Indicator of whether CEO has access to Company Plane (COPLANE) 
 
       2SLS 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v) 
       
SIZE (log of employees)  0.161***  0.168*** 0.145*** 0.168*** 0.261*** 
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.036) (0.101) 
SPAN (# of CEO reports)    -0.021***      -0.018** 
   (0.008)    (0.008) 
DEPTH (# of hierarchical levels)      0.082**     
     (0.034)    
FIRM  AGE      0.003***   
      (0.001)   
CEO Pay (log of salary + bonus)          -0.444 
       (0.417) 
Constant       6.267 
       (5.302) 
       
Year  Indicators  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SIC  Indicators  No No No No Yes 
       
Observations  2355 2355 2347 1101 2106 
(pseudo)  R-squared  0.13 0.14 0.14 0.19  -   39
Table 6: Perks and Private Benefits—Probit and Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent Variables are Indicator of whether CEO has access to Company Plane (COPLANE) and CEO-DM Differential Company Plane (DCOPLANE) 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  Differential  (v)  (vi)-2SLS 
SIZE 0.209***  0.169***  0.208***  0.110***  0.212***  0.323** 
  (0.032) (0.026) (0.032)  (0.041)  (0.033)  (0.147) 
CASHFLOW 0.022  -0.744 0.156  0.810 0.492  0.889 
  (0.544) (0.625) (0.555)  (0.934)  (0.570)  (0.744) 
EVA  -0.443 0.591 -0.505 -0.660  -0.796  -0.087 
  (0.597) (0.657) (0.611)  (1.012)  (0.629)  (0.812) 
GROWTH   0.585***  0.051  0.071  0.066  -0.031 
   (0.133)  (0.136)  (0.185)  (0.149)  (0.145) 
CASHFLOW*GROWTH   -5.745***         
   (2.035)        
JENSEN (Low growth/High Cash Flow)      0.027  -0.057  0.087  0.092 
     (0.056)  (0.065)  (0.064)  (0.072) 
HiGRLoCF (High growth/Low Cash Flow)      0.113***  0.172***  0.033  0.067 
     (0.042)  (0.061)  (0.082)  (0.075) 
DIVISION  SIZE      -0.094***     
      (0.028)     
FRACTINST (Fraction of Shares Held by Institutions)          -0.0763   
        (0.269)   
JENSEN*FRACTINST        -1.211**  -1.214** 
        (0.520)  (0.484) 
HiGRLoCF*FRACTINST        0.523  0.091 
        (0.526)  (0.550) 
CEO Pay (log of salary + bonus)            -0.673 
          (0.623) 
SPAN (# of CEO reports)  -0.015* -0.019** -0.015*    -0.013  -0.020** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    (0.009)  (0.010) 
Constant          9.024 
          (7.583) 
Observations  1927 2111 1927  1328  1524  1506 
(pseudo) R-squared  0.33  0.15  0.33  0.12  0.33  - 
Notes:  All specifications include 2-digit SIC indicators (except for column ii) and all include year indicator variables. Column (iv) is based on the CEO-DM company plane differential 
defined in the notes below Table 2.  Refer to notes below Table 5 for additional variable definitions and a description of 2SLS first-stage regression. Cash Flow is defined as (lagged) operating 
income before depreciation minus the sum of interest, taxes paid, and capital expenditures all divided by beginning of year assets.  EVA is defined as (lagged) operating income before 
depreciation minus the sum of depreciation, taxes paid, cost of capital (10% of beginning of year assets) all divided by beginning of year assets. GROWTH is defined as the average 3-digit 
SIC industry growth in the rate of investment (capital expenditures divided by lagged assets) in the future 3 periods. JENSEN and HiGRLoCF are indicator variables for firms in the lowest 
quartile of industry growth/highest quartile of cash flow, and highest quartile of industry growth /lowest quartile of cash flow, respectively, in a given year.  Division size is the average of the 
logarithm of division employees across divisions within a firm. FRACTINST is defined as the (lagged) fraction of shares owned by institutional shareholders with greater than 5 % ownership. 
All specifications report robust standard errors by clustering by firm and all variables have been winsorized at the 99
th percentile. ***/**/* represent significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.   40
Notes: All specifications include both industry (2 digit SIC) and year indicator variables. Refer to notes below Tables 5 and 6 for additional variable definitions and Table 5 for description 
of 2SLS first-stage regression. Column (iv) is based on the CEO-DM company plane differential defined in the notes below Table 2. POPULATION is defined as the logarithm of the 
number of people in thousands in the county in which the firm is headquartered. FLIGHTS is defined as the logarithm of the annual number of departing flights in a given year from 
airports within a 50-mile radius of the center of the county in which the firm is headquartered. DIVISION SIZE is the log of the average number of employees for divisions within a firm.  
All specifications report robust standard errors by clustering by firm and all variables have been winsorized at the 99
th percentile.  ***/**/* represent significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
Table 7:  Perks and Productivity-- Probit and Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent Variables are Indicator of whether CEO has access to Company Plane (COPLANE) and CEO-DM Differential Company Plane (DCOPLANE) 
 
  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) Differential  (v)  (vi) 2SLS 
SIZE  0.210*** 0.198*** 0.930*** 0.150*** 0.216***  0.268* 
  (0.029) (0.030) (0.345) (0.028) (0.035) (0.155) 
POPULATION -0.112***    0.030  -0.001  -0.125***  -0.074** 
  (0.028)  (0.073)  (0.026)  (0.031)  (0.032) 
FLIGHTS      -0.088***      
   (0.028)        
SIZE*POPULATION     -0.052**     
     (0.025)     
DIVISION  SIZE      -0.065***    
      (0.023)    
CASHFLOW       0.604  0.694 
       (0.608)  (0.708) 
EVA       -1.078  -0.321 
       (0.657)  (0.748) 
GROWTH       0.051  -0.038 
       (0.158)  (0.132) 
JENSEN (Low growth/High CF)          0.063  0.067 
       (0.068)  (0.069) 
HiGRLoCF  (High growth/Low CF)          -0.004  0.050 
       (0.084)  (0.068) 
FRACTINST (Fraction of Shares Held by Institutions)          -0.221  -0.208 
       (0.275)  (0.270) 
JENSEN*FRACTINST       -1.020**  -1.048** 
       (0.516)  (0.470) 
HiGRLoCF*FRACINST       0.592  0.135 
       (0.553)  (0.495) 
CEO pay (log of salary + bonus)            -0.424 
        (0.654) 
SPAN (# of CEO reports)  -0.014* -0.016** -0.013*    -0.013  -0.017* 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant        6.934 
        (7.688) 
Observations  2146 2073 2146 2122 1524 1506 
R-squared  0.36 0.36 0.37 0.17 0.38  --   41
 
Appendix AI—Perquisite Descriptions—1995 Hewitt survey 
 
 
Company plane:  The ability to schedule the company plane, not merely use it on a space-
available basis. 
 
Chauffer Service:  Chauffer service exclusively for executives, over and above general limousine 
service for business travel (e.g. to and from the airport).   
 
Club Memberships:  Company-paid memberships in luncheon, country, and health (athletic) 
clubs.  Does not include company-sponsored membership available to broad groups of 
employees.   
 
First-Class Air Travel:  The opportunity to travel first class on an unlimited basis or under certain 
specified conditions. 
 
Airline VIP Club Memberships:  Company-paid memberships in airline VIP clubs (e.g. Red 
Carpet, Ambassador, or Admiral Club). 
 
Spouse Travel:  The opportunity for spouses to accompany executives on business trips on a 
company-paid basis.   
 
Company Car:  Company cars provided to executives and managers only.  Does not  include car 
policy for sales personnel.   
 
Executive Dining Room:  Executive dining facilities that are separate and apart from those 
provided for the broad-based employee group.   
 
Individual Financial or Tax Counseling/ Estate Planning/ Income Tax Preparation:  Any type of 
individual, one-on-one financial counseling, income or gift tax return preparation, tax planning, 
and financial counseling.   
 
Financial Seminars:  Seminars conducted for small groups of executives or managers.  Such 
seminars are distinguishable from financial counseling by the lack of individually-tailored 
recommendations. 
 
Physical Examinations:  Routine physicals, comprehensive hospital examinations, and 
cardiovascular examinations. 
 
Home Security Systems:  Company-provided systems for executives’ homes such as fire alarms, 
burglar alarms, or generators for use in power failures.   
 
Loans:  Loans provided to executives at below-market interest rates (with or without restrictions).  
Does not include relocation loans or loans available from a tax-qualified retirement plan.   
 
Cellular Car Telephone or Other Mobile Communications Equipment:  Company-provided car 
telephone equipment for use by the executive for business and personal calls. 
 
Home Use of Company WATS line for Personal Calls:  Ability to access company WATS lines 
for personal calls from the executive’s home.   